She served on the editorial board of the American Sociological Review. One pervasive difference is average household income, where non-Muslims continue to earn significantly more than Muslims. Summing up their results, the authors make a strong claim that current national civic integration policies rest on erroneous assumptions which should be revised on the basis of accurate data. Yet they experience longer periods of unemployment than average, and less often work in positions of leadership and management. Social Science Quarterly 86: 1100-1116.
The two groups also have similar levels of general well-being and happiness. He is a Fulbright scholar and his primary interests include European politics, political behaviour and environmental politics. It is clear from these results that Muslim youth appear poised to take advantage of the same opportunities afforded to non - Muslims. Using the European Parliament's benchmarking guidelines, surveys and other non-official data, the authors find that in some areas Muslims are in fact more integrated than popularly assumed and suggest that, instead of failing to integrate, Muslims find their access to integration blocked in ways that reduce their life chances in the societies in which they are now permanent residents. For example, Muslims and non-Muslims express equal levels of life satisfaction and general happiness. Using the European Parliament's benchmarking guidelines, surveys and other non-official data, the authors find that in some areas Muslims are in fact more integrated than popularly assumed and suggest that, instead of failing to integrate, Muslims find their access to integration blocked in ways that reduce their life chances in the societies in which they are now permanent residents.
These nations have a range of alternative relationships between religion and the state, as well as strategies for coordinating individuals' ethnic and state identities. The results suggest that attention should be devoted to learning why foreign born Muslims or those holding citizenship of a foreign state feel advantaged in some Member-states in contrast to those Muslims who were born there or hold its citizenship. Before coming to Bloomsburg University in fall 2008, he taught at Loras College from 2005-08 and at Providence College from 2004-05. Seen as a Diaspora, Muslims appear to have a weak claim on their European homes. Associate Professor and Department Chair, Department of Political Science 215B Bakeless Center for Humanities 570-389-4086 pdf Peter Doerschler is an associate professor and department chair of political science who received his Ph.
Across all age groups, Muslims have lower household incomes, but on average, are happier than the control groups, even with regards to the economy. Are those Muslims who are not citizens, who were born outside of Europe or who are ethnic minorities more critical of the state and its institutions? Concerning their relationship status, Muslims are far less likely than non-Muslims to have lived with a partner before marriage or to have been divorced. Keywords: , , , , , , , Policy Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. These attitudes and habits reflect their integration into Europe, not self-segregation into parallel societies. Multiple sources conclude that Muslims have attained relatively equal levels of education except in Germany where a significant education gap persists. The authors suggest this might be because British and Dutch Muslims live in more ethnically and religiously mixed neighbourhoods than the more segregated French and German Muslims, hence exposing the former to a broader range of people in everyday life, some of who show hostile and anti-social attitudes.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. Worry about Crime, Discrimination and Trust in Government Institutions In answering these questions we examine data to evaluate conventional assumptions that Muslims in Europe seek to live in a parallel society or are poorly integrated more generally. In the final segment of our study, we found that Muslims generally hold more conservative values than non-Muslims. Data from the European Social Survey and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights provide a new perspective on Muslims in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in demonstrating so many similarities between Muslims and other Europeans. We examine several sources of data on Muslim well-being in Europe, and use official data available in the United Kingdom as a point of comparison. These nations have a range of alternative relationships between religion and the state, as well as strategies for coordinating individuals' ethnic and state identities.
Our goal is to demonstrate the ways in which official efforts to assess well-being can yield information enabling evaluation of assumptions about Muslims in Europe and promote recognition of the disparities between their life chances and those of their non-Muslim neighbors. Please, or to access full text content. In the same cross-national perspective, Muslims in France express more negative views of the police than their peers in the three other states. How do they feel about the European Parliament? Emerging clearly from our findings is the urgency of gathering official data on the social and economic situation of Muslims in comparison to other Europeans in those states where these data are not now collected. In some states, more religious Muslims report greater life satisfaction and overall happiness though less education than less religious Muslims. Electoral Studies 31 1 : 46-59.
Keywords: Integration; Immigration; European Commission on Racism and Intolerance; European Agency for Fundamental Rights; European Social Survey; German General Social Survey; Muslim well-being; Social Cohesion in Europe; Council of Europe; Minorities and Marginalization Chapter. Given that Muslims also attribute more significance to religion for their lives and values than other Europeans do, it would be interesting to know more about how values identified with religion are related to these other views. Their confidence in the educational, health and economic systems of their European state is not much different from that of their European neighbours, and in many areas is more positive. Of the states we study, only the United Kingdom gathers official data on Muslims and other religious groups. For example, a higher percentage of Muslims believe it is important for people to be treated equally and that government should work more actively to reduce income inequalities. For example, female Muslims have higher life satisfaction but not greater overall happiness in France and Germany than their male counterparts while men report higher average years of education and more hours worked. Journal of International Migration and Integration Aug.
With the exception of France, Muslims also rate the state of education in the country more favorably than non-Muslims. He is a Fulbright scholar and his primary interests include European politics, political behaviour and environmental politics. We look separately throughout our analyses at those groups of Muslims widely expected to be most vulnerable in Europe: the young 15-29 , males, highly religious, foreign nationals and those born abroad. These nations have a range of alternative relationships between religion and the state, as well as strategies for coordinating individuals' ethnic and state identities. Results from both the British Crime Survey and the European Social Survey highlight some areas in which Muslims are more worried about crime than non-Muslims. This highly topical book aims to undermine unsubstantiated myths by examining Muslim integration in Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, states which dominate the debate on minority integration and the practice of Muslim religious traditions. These experiences have given rise to skepticism regarding the ability of European governments to effectively integrate their increasingly diverse populations.
In Germany, however, which only recently 2001 changed its law to allow non-ethnic Germans to acquire citizenship, holding a citizenship correlates with lower degrees of experienced discrimination. This highly topical book aims to undermine unsubstantiated myths by examining Muslim integration in Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, states which dominate the debate on minority integration and the practice of Muslim religious traditions. This authoritative study demonstrates convincingly that Muslims do want to join mainstream society but are often rejected by their non-Muslim fellow citizens. Where Muslims indicated less trust than others—for example, in France, where Muslims distrust the police — the results were not surprising in light of international investigation and condemnation of the widespread practice of racial profiling by French police and targeting young Muslim men for random identity checks. French Muslims report significantly lower trust in the police than non-Muslims, which corresponds with French invasive policing of migrant communities; and British and Dutch Muslims are more worried about being subject to crime and anti-social behaviour than British non-Muslims, French and German Muslims. Taken together, these results provide considerable evidence that Muslims in general, and more specifically Muslims in groups thought to be vulnerable, possess the requisite attitudes to help European states economically, politically and socially. Together, the data sets and analysis, illustrated through tables and diagrams, make for an accessible and well-documented study.